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The Philosophical World of Meiji Japan
The Philosophy of Organism and Its Genealogy
Originally published as「明治の哲学界：有機体の哲学とその系譜」in 井上克人編
『豊饒なる明治』, Kansai Daigaku Shuppannbu, 2012, 3–22. Translated by Mori-
sato Takeshi. 
German Idealism was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the middle 
of Meiji era and was mainly received from a mystical or religious perspec-
tive, as we see in Inoue Tetsujirō’s “harmonious existence,” Inoue Enryō’s 
“unity of mind and body,” and Kiyozawa Manshi’s “existentialism.” Since 
these theories envisioned true reality as a unified and living whole, I group 
them under the label “philosophy of organism” and from there argue that 
their conviction that “all is truth and truth is all” was shaped in large part 
by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. The understanding of Bud-
dhist concepts by Meiji philosophers was philosophical in its content, and 
those who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy were 
encouraged to describe Eastern thought in Western philosophical terms. 
As a result, the philosophical world of the Meiji era developed an original 
standpoint that unified Eastern and Western perspectives by means of a 
logic of “phenomena-in-reality.” 
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After the Meiji Restoration, the modernization of the Japanese nation  swung into high gear. The leaders of the new government hurriedly 
organized a governing structure for the country, driven above all by the need 
to maintain independence and security vis-à-vis Western colonial advances 
in Asia. Pressed by demand for a “rich country with a strong army” (富国
強兵), they considered the assimilation of modern Western civilization 
a means to that end. Hence, they promptly set in place a series of govern-
ment policies related to their new age of Enlightenment (文明開化). In the 
private sector those who resonated best with these government policies 
and contributed to their promotion were the scholars of Dutch learning, 
including Nishi Amane (1829–1897) and Tsuda Masamichi (1829–1902), 
who belonged to the famous society of Meiji intellectuals known as the 
Meirokusha (明六社). Both Nishi and Tsuda studied under the econom-
ics professor, Simon Vissering (1818–1888), at the University of Leiden for 
two years in Netherlands. While seriously engaging with the so-called “five 
subjects” (Law, International Law, State Theory, Economics, and Statistics), 
they extended their interests not only to contemporary Dutch intellectuals, 
but also to the English utilitarianism of J. S. Mill (1773–1836), which was 
influential throughout Europe, and the French positivism of August Comte 
(1798–1857). They made great efforts to absorb Western philosophical ideas 
as best as they could and succeeded in introducing them to their fellow 
intellectuals after returning to the homeland. 
These philosophical ideas fit in well with Japan’s ongoing modernization 
and its tendency towards practical studies. In search of a theoretical basis for 
the modernization of Japanese life and thought, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–
1901) and Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916)—along with other scholars, including 
Nishi and Tsuda at the Meiroksha—focused on transplanting Western posi-
tivism and utilitarianism into the intellectual soil of Japan. To understand 
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modern views of humanity and society, they found Mill’s works especially 
appealing and drew on them as the philosophical foundations for the Free-
dom and People’s Rights Movement. Nakamura Masanao’s 1871 translation 
of On Liberty was widely read among the general public and played a sig-
nificant role in the proliferation of ideas about freedom and rights. From 
the late 1870s on, however, greater attention was given to introducing and 
adapting Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism than to Mill’s texts. The grow-
ing interest in Spencer produced a flurry of translations. Among them, Mat-
sushima Gō’s translation of Social Statistics was singled out for praise by 
Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919) as “a textbook for freedom and people’s rights” 
and enjoyed a wide readership.
Meantime, as absolutism was taking hold in the Meiji government dur-
ing the 1880s, attention was turned to advances being made in Germany, 
once underdeveloped but now emerging in the van of Europe’s new capital-
ism. In November 1881, an officer of the lower house of parliament, Inoue 
Kowashi (1844–1895), proposed a series of policies aimed at suppressing 
the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement based on English and French 
philosophy. Such a movement, it was felt, could easily stir up opposition to 
the government on any number of fronts. Inoue’s plan was to reinforce the 
educational system by monitoring the newspapers, promoting the “way of 
loyalty and submission” through the encouragement of Chinese learning 
(漢学), and promoting German studies as a way to undercut the increasing 
influence of English and French studies, a supposed hotbed for revolution-
ary thought. Among the countries of Europe, Germany’s government was 
aligned with a royal family. For Inoue, this meant that the promotion of 
German studies would help the government cultivate a conservative spirit 
among the public. In later years, the political administration of the Japanese 
government was carried out along the lines of this conservatism in opposi-
tion to the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement. In this way, academic 
philosophy during the Meiji period took shape in accord with a politically 
induced transition from English and French studies to German studies. 
i
The Japanese reception of Western philosophy in the Meiji period 
also sparked fundamental reflections on traditional ways of learning and 
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thinking. It is no exaggeration to say that Confucian models of thought and 
behavior cultivated since the time of the Tokugawa shogunate were the rep-
resentative modes of life and thought peculiar to the Japanese people at the 
time. Children were still being raised by the remaining Confucian scholars. 
Since the elementary school education they were receiving was established 
with the promulgation of the new educational system in 1872, it was only 
natural that they would learn to read and interpret not only the Four Books 
and Five Classics but also other Confucian texts as well as historical Chinese 
works. Thus, as the generation of intellectuals born in the wake of the Meiji 
Restoration became literate, their burning desire for knowledge was stimu-
lated by the classical Chinese texts accessible to them. The academic curios-
ity piqued by these texts was challenged by the reality of an entire nation 
trying to modernize itself. Still, the worldview and values that saturated 
their flesh and blood seemed to hold these new intellectuals back from 
direct intellectual expression. Although they might not explicitly criticize 
the premodern, feudalistic ways of Confucian ethics, neither were they able 
any longer to follow them blindly. That said, during this period their ways 
of thinking remained rather Confucian in a number of respects. We get a 
glimpse of the significance of traditional Confucian ethics for Meiji intel-
lectuals from the words of Yamaji Aizan (1864–1917):
I have given up the teachings of Confucianism, but I cannot possibly for-
get the sweetness with which Confucianism unifies the Way of humanity 
with that of heaven, and grounds the feelings of the righteous in what is 
unchangeable.1
How, then, did the philosophers of modern Japan who had been brought 
up in such a tradition understand the modern academic philosophy peculiar 
to the West? How did they wrestle with it? Western philosophy, with its 
origins in ancient Greece, is distinguished by its systematic nature. In other 
words, it traces the source of all knowledge back to ultimate principles from 
which it can construct a comprehensive system that embraces all things. 
Accordingly, the fundamental problem of philosophy is the search for first 
principles. The task of the philosopher is to devise a method for organizing 
all knowledge through these principles. 
1. Yamaji and Tokutomi 1971, 392.
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This “philosophy” defined classical studies in the West, but the rise of 
modern science marked a revolution against classical ideas of academic 
work. Modern science did not follow a deductive method whose conclu-
sions relied on the assumption of ultimate principles, but an inductive 
method that takes its lead from empirical facts and relies mainly on experi-
ment and verification for its conclusions. Dutch Studies in Japan also quali-
fied as an “empirical science” in this sense. Moreover, the “philosophy” that 
was transplanted in the early Meiji period was an empirical philosophy from 
the modern West shaped by the ideas of the scientific revolution. 
If we had to express the basic mark of modernity with a single phrase, we 
might say that it is “discriminating thought.” First, the distinction between 
humans and the natural world that was the hallmark of modernity is the 
very point at which modern science was established. To the modern way 
of thinking, the world is best understood in tandem with the culture of 
scientific technology. What is more, the unfolding of the cognitive sub-
ject—which came about at the same time of the discovery of objective, 
mechanistic nature—made us conscious not only of human values but also 
of a universal ego or spirit. It was this way of thinking that defined the meth-
odology behind the strict separation of subject and object. It understood 
the laws of the outer world as constructions of the cognitive subject. This 
was the epoch-making mode of thought that confronted the Japanese for 
the first time as they encountered Western thought in the Meiji era. 
From the other side, Song Studies (宋学) had sunk deep roots in the 
Japanese intellectual tradition during the Tokugawa-period. Based on the 
I Ching and a nature-based speculative thinking, it was further enhanced 
by the philosophy of “yin yang and the five elements” (陰陽五行説). Its dis-
tinctive focus on a practical ethic grounded in the Four Books (the Analects, 
Mencius, Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean) took shape by merg-
ing Chan and Huayan Buddhist thought with that of the Laozi. The result 
was a highly speculative metaphysical system. Besides promoting the “five 
constancies and five moral principles” (五常五倫), it was distinguished by an 
extraordinary mode of thought that sought to unite human beings and the 
natural world by grounding both in one and the same principle and the idea 
that “we share roots with heaven and earth and are one with all things.” 
Accordingly, the solution to moral problems besetting humans beings lay 
in restoring the unity of humans and nature by eliminating selfishness and 
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self-serving desires. The tradition of Confucianism that strove to include 
humans in the eternal universe stood diametrically opposed to the episte-
mology of modern Western philosophy with its separation of subject and 
object and, hence, its subjugation of the natural world to the knowing sub-
ject. 
ii
In the midst of the conflict between the traditional Confucian and 
modern Western ways of thinking, Nakajima Rikizō (1858–1918) introduced 
Thomas Hill Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics in the course of essays devoted 
to explaining epistemological and ethical ideas. Under the title “English 
Neo-Kantianism,” Nakajima’s essays appear in the pages of Japan’s Journal of 
Philosophy between December 1892 and February 1893. The upshot was that 
Green’s theory of “self-development” became a kind of fashion in the Jap-
anese philosophical academy. As Watanabe Kazuyasu, notes, these Green’s 
ideas were discussed and interpreted in line with the prevailing Confucian 
understanding of ethics. 
In the preface to his 1901 book The Philosophy of the Japanese Zhu Xi 
School, Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944) argued that on many points “moral-
ity of the Zhu Xi school is in accord with what English neo-Kantians like 
Green and John Henry Muirhead have to say about ethics.” Similarly, the 
scholar of Chinese thought, Oyanagi Shigeta (1870–1940) observed in an 
essay on “The Theory of Self-Realization and Confucian Ethics” (Journal of 
Philosophy, 1905) that neo-Kantian
ideas of self-realization resemble Song Studies in the sense that the latter sets 
forth a theory of the supreme ultimate 太極 which argues that our minds are 
nothing other than its working.2
In fact, many of Green’s arguments resounded deeply with those who had 
grown up in the Confucian tradition. The basic theme that comes through 
his Prolegomena is a strong awareness of personhood and self-development. 
As a student of German idealism (especially Hegel), Green had become the 
representative of neo-Hegelian thought in England. Beginning from the 
2. Cited in Watanabe 1985, 287.
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assumption of a rational principle that transcends all phenomena and yet 
permeates the real world, he had proceeded to lay out his own theory of self-
development. For him, the human mind is essentially nothing other than a 
manifestation of the transcendent principle of the cosmos, which becomes 
visible to the extent that individual consciousnesses achieves a unity of expe-
rience. Thus, when that unity is fully realized in a particular individual, it 
becomes a manifestation of absolute spirit; the self becomes, for the first 
time, the true self. Approximation of this unity constitutes personhood, 
and the realization of the true self represents not only the good of the self 
but also the common good. This line of thinking bears a striking resem-
blance to Song ethics and its notion of “nature-in-principle” (性即理) which 
champions “return to one’s original nature.” At the same time, Green’s ideal 
of self-development was fundamentally in line with the assertion in the 
Great Learning that individual attainment of piety leads to a sense of ethi-
cal responsibility toward the world. It comes as no surprise that by the late 
1890s, the introduction and assimilation of personalism and idealist ethics 
stemming from German idealism (including Kant and Fichte) was gaining 
in popularity among Japanese intellectuals.
This served as an occasion for promoting individual self-consciousness as 
the hallmark of ethical personhood. When it came to grounding this idea 
metaphysically, however, a debate arose between those adhering to Brit-
ish “personal idealism” (such as Yoshida Seichi) and those who followed 
German “absolute idealism” (including Kitazawa Sadakichi and Kihira 
Tadayoshi). In 1909 Tomonaga Sanjūrō (1871–1951) penned an essay enti-
tled “My Reflections on the Philosophy of Personalism” in which he took 
up the historical and philosophical significance of the debate as a platform 
from which to argue the direction he felt Meiji philosophy should take. 
Tomonaga divides philosophies into three types—philosophies based on 
personality, theories of the absolute opposed to personalism, and natural 
philosophies—and suggests the ethnolinguistic distribution of each.3 In a 
word, Anglo-American philosophy with its emphasis on personalism “tries 
to give metaphysical value to the individual spirit”; German theories of the 
absolute (idealism and pantheism) display “transpersonal or antipersonal 
tendencies”; while French theories of nature lean toward sensationalism, 
3. Cf. Shimomura and Furuta 1965, 24.
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hedonism, determinism, and materialism. In this way, he suggested, particu-
lar philosophies take on particular ethnic, linguistic, and national inclina-
tions as each of them makes its home in a particular country. For Japan, this 
resulted in a constitutional monarchy and the adoption of the system of self-
government. Tomonaga notes in this connection that, “the importation of 
philosophies based on personalism is most significant,” but “both in a posi-
tive and in a negative sense, the traditional philosophy of our country is no 
doubt transpersonal and impersonal.” He goes on: 
A philosophy centered on the Buddhist notion of no-self continues to exer-
cise a broad and deep control over people’s minds, while customs focusing on 
the universal retains its strength among people as a vestigial influence carried 
over fom the feudal era.
Here Tomonaga makes a prediction that the “personal idealism will be trans-
personalized or non-personalized as it enters our country.”
As Tomonaga predicted, a lot of works that interpreted German phi-
losophy through the medium of traditional Japanese Buddhism and Song 
Studies were published in Japan. They include Inoue Tetsujirō’s theory of 
phenomenon-in-reality (現象即実在論), Inoue Enryō’s theory of corre-
spondence between mind and things as they are (真如物心の相即論), 
Kiyozawa Manshi’s seishinshugi (精神主義), which argues for the salvation 
of ego through its unity with the transpersonal absolute, and Tsunashima 
Ryōsen’s “My Experiments with Seeing God” that represents the philosophy 
of religious ecstasy (法悦). We may also mention Miyake Setsurei (1860–
1945), who demonstrated a tendency toward romanticism in his work The 
Cosmos, where he laid out his grand metaphysical speculation. Hashimoto 
Mineo has aptly characterized this viewpoint of taking true existence as the 
comprehensive unity of a living totality in which the dichotomy between 
self and other is overcome (自他不二) as a “philosophy of organism.”4 
iii
Just what does this “organism” or “the organic” mean? The fifth 
edition of the standard dictionary of the Japanese language (『広辞苑) 
4. Hashimoto 1969. 
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defines it as “that which possesses the necessary relation of its parts and 
whole through a single organization of many parts where each part is uni-
fied with other through certain purposes.” In general terms, this means 
that the living totality is established through a single principle that unifies 
the various parts with their various functions. An organism is not a con-
tingent aggregate of parts brought together through external relationships 
to each other. Each of the parts contains a certain necessary and internal 
relationship to the whole and to the other parts. The single principle that 
unifies the whole is not something added from without but exists within 
the whole. The best example of such an organism is a living creature, but it 
also applies to the organic body of a state, a society, a history, the universe, 
and so forth.5
In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the gist of his notion of an 
organism as an entity that maintains itself by relating to the other. In other 
words, it refers to an existing thing that, while relating to the other, returns 
to itself and thus holds itself in existence. In this sense, it is its own purpose. 
Purpose is internal to the organism, and all of its activities constitute the 
process of realizing that purpose. Since it realizes its purpose by relating to 
the other and returning to itself, it cannot possibly exist without the other. 
Its relationship to the other is itself something internal and essential. The 
relation of cause and effect is also subsumed into the process of the self ’s 
realization of its purpose through its relatedness to the other, and in this 
sense is a constituent element of this process. In contrast, from a mechanis-
tic standpoint, the individual first exists in itself, and its relation to the other 
consists of an external, causal relationship. There is no internal purpose here, 
only purpose given to it from without. In other words, as Goethe believes, 
when we taken leave of the external, contingent unity that non-organic or 
mechanical views of nature represent and come to an organic view of nature, 
nature is see to be that in which 
All lives and moves and weaves 
Into a whole! Each part gives and receives 
Angelic powers ascend and redescend 
And each to each their golden vessels lend; 
Fragrant with blessing, as on wings
5. Cf. Miyamoto et al. 1935.
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From heaven through the earth and through all things
Their movement thrusts, and all in harmony it sings!6
Morphologically speaking, each living thing constitutes itself through its 
original form and its metamorphoses, thereby maintaining its self-identity 
even as it differentiates itself. To wit, it is in its purposive characteristics that 
internal and necessary unity can be seen in nature. 
What we mean by the term “organism,” then, is nothing other than “life” 
itself, for it is only in life that the universal and the particular, the infinite and 
the finite are unified by being mutually subsumed into each other, and this 
in turn gives meaning to each part of life and each of its processes. Mecha-
nistic views that understand nature only through causal relationships among 
individual objects cannot give us an accurate picture of nature as such. They 
rather ignore the organic interrelations that are inherent in nature. 
Such organic and living nature, saturated with “life” as it is, is a far cry 
from “objective nature” as understood by a knowing subject. It must rather 
be seen as the “place” (basho 場所) in which each individual is placed, into 
which it is “thrown,” and by which it is subsumed. The mechanical view of 
nature we find in Western modernity regards nature as something set up in 
opposition to the knowing subject, that is, as dead and inorganic matter. As 
a result, nature is treated as an assortment of materials for science and tech-
nology to work on. It leads us, as it were, to forgetfulness of fundamental, 
living nature. 
iv
Let us now return to Meiji philosophy. German idealism was 
introduced to Japan after 1887, but it had a peculiar reception in the sense 
that Japanese intellectuals tried to locate the foundations of idealism in 
European scientific theories by approaching it from a mystical and reli-
gious angle. Inoue Tetsujirō and Inoue Enryō (1858–1919) stand out here. 
Their philosophies were marked by the acknowledgement of a fixed meta-
physical absolute (実在 or 真如) behind phenomena and by their attempts 
to argue that position making use of the scientific theory of “energetics.” 
6. Goethe 1987, 17. 
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Regardless of the science they appealed to, their philosophical standpoints 
lie in the theory of phenomena-in-reality (現象即実在論). In short, their 
idea was that existence does not lie behind phenomena but resides within 
them. Their framework did not presuppose an external transcendent other 
but amounted to a noumenal monism, an idea that lays at the foundations 
of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. Their philosophies reiterated the core 
argument of one of the most important texts of Buddhism, the Awakening 
of Faith in the Mahayana7 (to which we will return later), namely, that all is 
truth and truth is all (万法是真如、真如是万法). 
Tetsujirō’s philosophical standpoint is also referred to as the theory of 
harmonious existence (円融実在論). This idea was put forth in volume 12 
of the Journal of Philosophy, but his theoretical standpoint had already taken 
shape in his New Theory of Ethics, published in 1883 when the Freedom and 
People’s Rights Movement was at its height. There he argued that “existence” 
and “force” (勢力) lay behind the phenomena of the world. Being in accord 
with the “tendencies of the force” was, for him, the “main point of ethics.” 
However, this force and existence do not lie behind phenomena but exist 
within them. In a word, what we have here is a philosophical transformation 
of “Eastern pantheism” or Buddhism. It is none other than a recasting of the 
foundational Buddhist notion of the truth (tathatā 真如) as that which uni-
fies the world of discriminate things and is realized in all phenomena. But 
Tetsujirō goes further. In the effort to demonstrate this viewpoint scientifi-
cally, he refers to existence as something electronic. In one sense, his idea is 
rather farfetched and given to sophistry. Yet, if we look at his arguments in 
relation to his further claim that existence is not the object of knowledge 
but something directly intuited, their strong Buddhist coloring stands out 
in relief. 
v
Hara Tanzan (1819–1892), to whom Tetsujirō looked up as a men-
tor, influenced his Buddhist “ontology of harmonious existence.” His philo-
sophical work on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana was selected as 
the textbook for a course on Buddhist texts at Tokyo Imperial University. 
7. Hereafter, afm. 
20 | European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 1 • 2016
Subsequently, the “theory of phenomena-in-reality” came to designate the 
metaphysics or transcendental realism subscribed to by students of Hara’s 
such as Inoue Tetsujirō, Inoue Enryō, Kiyozawa Manshi, Miyake Setsu rei, 
and others. 
Hara elaborated a method of investigating Buddhism not only as a brand 
of Indian philosophy but also as a general philosophy of mind by highlight-
ing comparisons between the philosophical content of fundamental Bud-
dhist teachings and Western philosophy. Young intellectuals obsessed with 
the new philosophy from the West were led to recognize the fact that a 
unique philosophical system, one that was by no means inferior to West-
ern philosophy, had existed since ancient times in the far eastern corners 
of Asia. They were encouraged to enhance Eastern thought by incorporat-
ing conceptual structures from Western philosophy. As a result, they came 
to generate a philosophical standpoint that was later dubbed the theory of 
phenomena-in-reality. 
When Tokyo Imperial University opened in 1877, the dean of the Depart-
ment of Arts and Letters, and devotee of philosophy Katō Hiroyuki (1836–
1916), visited Hara and requested that he inaugurate a proposed new course 
of “Lectures on Buddhist Texts” course.8 Hara accepted and began teaching 
the elective course in November of 1879. In the annual report to the univer-
sity he remarked: 
At the Prime Minister’s request, I began by lecturing on three Buddhist 
texts at the university from November 1879 to June 1881: the Sutra of Perfect 
Enlightenment, the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, and the Treatise on 
One Hundred Dharmas. We were all delighted with the right to include Bud-
dhism as part of Indian philosophy in the curriculum of the Department of 
Arts and Letters and to find it approved in September of this year (1882) as 
an official university program. Accordingly, I decided on two textbooks for 
my course, the Fǔ jiāo biān9 and the Vimalakīrti Sutra.10 
Philosophically speaking, Hara’s lectures on the afm were considered 
8. For the connection between Hara and Inoue Tetsujirō’s theory of phenomena-in-reality, 
see Watabe 1998 and 1999. 
9. [『輔教編』is an eleventh-century critique of Buddhism by a Confucian scholar. –Trans.]
10. Cf. “A Report on Hara Tanzan and his Course on Indian Philosophy,” published in Sep-
tember 1881 and December 1882. The passage cited here is from Mitsuhashi 1976, 600.
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highly progressive by Buddhist scholars at the time in that he was teaching 
students to think of truth and reality (真如実相) in conjunction with the 
metaphysics of German idealism. The course title “Lectures on Buddhist 
Texts” was renamed “Indian Philosophy,” and to this day it is still offered at 
Tokyo University. Hara did not, however, think of Buddhism as a “religion” 
in the Western sense of the term, that is, as unity of the human with a per-
sonal and transcendent absolute. Rather, he understood it as a comprehen-
sion and interpretation of the ways in which existence can be understood 
in reference to the various changes occurring in the minds and hearts of 
individual sentient beings, which he took to be the central concern of Bud-
dhism. His choice of the afm was a natural one. Needless to say, advocates 
of the theory of “phenomena-in-reality” all took Hara’s courses on Buddhist 
texts and Indian philosophy. 
Tetsujirō was among the first generation of students at the Faculty of Arts 
and Letters at Tokyo Imperial University, graduating in 1880. He described 
his teacher in memoirs written in his late years: 
Interestingly, a Zen monk named Hara Tanzan came to the university as 
a lecturer and taught us how to read Buddhist texts. As I listened to his 
lectures, I came to feel for the first time the charm of Mahayana Buddhist 
philosophy. For me it provided an occasion to cultivate an inseparable 
relationship with Buddhism. Even today, I still study the philosophy of 
Mahayana Buddhism with great interest.11 
vi 
Inoue Enryō, who graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University 
four years after Inoue Tetsujirō, entered university in 1881 and graduated four 
years later. A novice in the Ōtani branch of Shin Buddhism, Enryō was par-
ticularly attracted to the works of Ernest Fenollosa (1853–1908) during his 
university years. His own arguments for phenomena-in-reality were based 
on the afm and incorporated in his first text, A Short Discussion of Philoso-
phy, published in 1886 and widely read among the general public. Nishida 
Kitarō also counted it among his favorite texts. Following its publication, 
Enryō published a number of texts pertaining to the theory. Through these 
11. Inoue Tetsujirō 2003, 293–4.
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endeavors, he sought to construct a way of understanding Buddhism in rela-
tion to Western philosophy. Along with a philosophical reconstruction of 
Buddhism, he argued enthusiastically for Buddhism’s Buddhism to Western 
philosophy and Christianity. Allow me briefly to introduce the content of 
his Prolegomena to a Living Discourse on Buddhism (1887).
Enryō argued against the feasibility of publicly acknowledging Christi-
anity as providing support for the expansion of Japanese rights and revision 
of treaties. The strength of his conviction appears in passages like the follow-
ing:
Thus, for these reasons, I would propose a resolute revision of Buddhism and 
its designation as the religion of the Enlightenment. I believe this to comply 
with the purpose of a single scholar’s search for the truth and with the aim of 
an individual to become a member of society and serve the state.12 
To do this, Enryō tried to find ways in which Buddhism and philosophy 
(German idealism) can be said to complement one another. According to 
him, matter and mind (物心) are not originally separate but are derived from 
a single “ontological substance” (原躰). He asserts that only Buddhism can 
elucidate the nature of this separation and the relationship of ontological 
substance with matter-mind. In this way, the Buddhist view of truth unfolds 
along the lines of the logic of German idealism. In other words, Enryō 
located truth and matter-mind in the relationship between reality and phe-
nomena. He began his Buddhist metaphysics by asserting that “matter-mind 
is an image, truth is the substance, and power is what develops from the 
truth of matter-mind.”13 
He employs expressions that sound similar to the afm, such as the famous 
analogy of the wave from the text: 
The phrases water-in-wave and wave-in-water indicate the reason why truth 
and all things are inseparable from each other, just as there are no waves  
without water and no water without waves. We call this truth-correspon-
dence.14 
Enryō devoted a number of pages to developing a theory of “harmonious 
12. Inoue Enryō 1987, 354.
13. Ibid., 368.
14. Ibid., 370.
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interrelation” wherein the “relationship between truth and matter-mind is 
an identity-in-difference and a difference-in-identity, a unity-in-duality and 
a duality-in-unity.”15 In doing so, he basically inherited the framework of 
the afm, which he had learned in great part from Hara. Illustration of these 
various points clearly demonstrate a theoretical attitude common among 
advocates of the theory of phenomena-in-reality. In this sense, the Buddhist 
philosopher Hara Tanzan had already proposed the basic structure of the 
theory of phenomena-in-reality. 
Like Inoue Enryō before him, Kiyozawa Manshi was trained by the 
Ōtani branch of the Shinshū sect. In his case, however, we see only a weak 
connection to Hara. After graduating from the Department of Philosophy 
at Tokyo Imperial University, Kiyozawa majored in philosophy of religion 
during his graduate studies. He also took a profound interest in Fenollosa’s 
lectures on the history of philosophy, which seem to have drawn him partic-
ularly to the study Hegelian philosophy. During the time Kiyozawa was his 
student, Fenollosa converted to Buddhism. Fenollosa’s lectures on Herbert 
Spencer’s theory of the unknown and German idealism in particular help 
account for Kiyozawa’s comprehensive investigation of similarities between 
Buddhism and Western philosophy. 
Kiyozawa also studied the works of R. Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), and 
from there went on to establish his own position on the theory of phenom-
ena-in-reality. Since he was a scholar-monk in the Shin Buddhist tradition, 
we may assume that he inherited the basic form of this onto-phenomeno-
logical theory from his predecessor Inoue Enryō. Among Kiyozawa’s texts 
we may single out Pure Philosophy (1889), which shows Lotze’s influence, 
and Outline of the Philosophy of Religion (1892), which developed a first-rate 
theory of religion in general. 
Miyake Setsurei was a writer possessed of great journalistic talents but 
also demonstrating considerable intellectual gifts through works on the 
history of philosophy and intellectual history in general. His ability to 
understand the nature of dialectic is particularly worthy of note. After he 
graduated from the Department of Philosophy at the Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity, he worked for an editorial office before securing a position with the 
Ministry of Education under the title of associate professor at the Imperial 
15. Ibid., 371.
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University of Tokyo. There he researched the history of Buddhism, resulting 
in A History of Japanese Buddhism and A Concise History of Christianity in 
1886. Among his numerous publications, the text that best resonates with 
the theory of phenomena-in-reality is a 1892 essay entitled “A Brief Intro-
duction to My Point of View.”
vii
To return to Inoue Tetsujirō, we cannot overlook the fact that he 
was influenced not only by Hara but also by the American Ernest Fenolossa, 
who taught him Western philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University. Feno-
lossa was especially fond of German philosophy, Darwinism, and Spencer, 
the latter of whom had attracted a great deal of attention as the greatest phi-
losopher at the age. His lectures, which made use of both philosophical and 
sociological frameworks, were based on Spencer’s First Principles (1862). 
Through Fenollosa’s guidance, Tetsujirō was led to develop his own phi-
losophy in the New Theory of Ethics, where he focused on Spencer’s notion 
of the “unknowable.” The term was introduced as a philosophical expres-
sion for the metaphysical concept of divine transcendence, which also went 
by other names such as the “indefinable infinite,” the “first cause of the uni-
verse,” and the “infinite absolute.” 
Spencer’s philosophy also appears in Inoue’s speculations on the compari-
son between phenomena, which are the objects of sensible experience, and 
reality, which Tetsujirō characterized as a mystery lying behind phenomena 
and beyond the grasp of the senses.16 Tetsujirō himself associated the English 
term reality with the Japanese term for substance, jittai (実体). (Nowadays it 
is more common to render reality as 実在.) According to Watabe, Tetsujirō’s 
usage reflected the translation adapted in the first Japanese dictionary of 
philosophy, of which he himself was one of the editors.17 The entry for the 
English term “reality” gives an insight into Tetsujirō’s own thinking:
Reality is jittai 実体, shinnyo 真如. See also the Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahayana.
16. Inoue Tetsujirō 1967, 419.
17. 『哲學字彙』, 1881.
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There is no mistaking the apposition of reality to the notion of truth in the 
afm, namely, the profound, transcendent, and true reality that exceeds all 
explanation. It is no less obvious that truth is seen to fall in line with Spen-
cer’s notion of the “indefinable infinite” and the “unknowable.” It seems 
only logical that we now take a closer look at the afm. 
viii
The text of the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana dates from 
the sixth century and was authored by Aśvaghoṣa. Only two Chinese trans-
lations of the work have survived. Paramārtha (499–569) published the 
first translation as a single volume in 550. Śikṣānanda (652–710) issued a 
second translation in two volumes between 695 and 700. No Sanskrit or 
Tibetan translation is extant, nor can we find it cited anywhere in Indian 
Buddhism. On those grounds, some have argued that it was compiled origi-
nally in China, but the matter is still open to debate. At any rate, the text 
encapsulates the core of the Mahayana Buddhist teachings spread via central 
Asia to China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. The extent of its influence on 
Chinese and Japanese Buddhism is beyond measure. The Tendai philosophy 
of original awakening (本覚) can be traced to the afm where, in contrast 
with incipient awakening (始覚) and non-awakening (不覚), it is present as 
final awakening (究竟覚). 
The key term around which the text pivots is the “mind of sentient 
beings” that epistemologically constitutes the “single mind” or “store con-
sciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna 阿黎耶識) that constitute the “mind of potential 
buddhahood” (tathāgata-garbha 如来蔵), which ontologically is truth itself 
(tathatā 真如). What we are translating as “truth itself ” literally means “as 
it is naturally.” The Chinese translation is composed of two glyphs, the first 
of which indicates the negation of falsity or delusion, and the second, equal 
and non-discriminating self-identity. The original Sanskrit term from which 
the Chinese is derived signifies the true way of being or the true reality to 
which nothing has been added and from which nothing has been taken 
away.
Now, the mind of sentient beings is composed of two inseparable aspects: 
the mind in its true suchness (心真如) and the mind that comes to be and 
passes way (心生滅). The originally quiescent mind is pure in itself and tran-
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scends the vicissitudes of time to which the arising and ceasing mind is sus-
ceptible. It neither arises into being nor does it cease to be. Yet even as it 
is immutable, immortal, and nontemporal, in reality it belongs to ordinary 
and ignorant persons. As such is beset by afflictions (kleśa) and will one day 
arrive at extinction. The truth beset by affliction is what is called the “mind 
of potential buddhahood.” For even though that potential itself is pure 
truth, at the same time, it is a defiled truth (在纏位の真如) hidden from view 
by the darkness of ignorance (無明). Hence its whereabouts are said to be “a 
harmony of birth-and-extinction with the neither-born-nor-extinct, such 
that it is neither one now two.” This does not mean that the truth and afflic-
tion are harmonized into one. Rather, the potential for the true suchness of 
buddhahood retains the essential purity of the mind in such a way that even 
as the mind is beset by affliction it is not infected by it. That which neither 
comes into being nor passes away, just as it is, comes to be and passes away. 
To return to the metaphor of water and waves that we saw Enryō refer 
to earlier, the water becomes waves through the external causality of the 
wind (afflictions), but water continues to be the same water it always is. Its 
surface is whipped up into waves as the wind arises and returns to a glassy 
mirror as the wind subsides. Whatever waves the activity of the wind may 
produce, the wetness that makes it water remains unchanged. However giant 
the wave, the depth of the water is unchanged. In this sense, whatever shape 
water takes, it maintains its identity as water and transcends the shape of the 
waves. Water itself, in its transcendent unity, is aroused to take shape in vari-
ous forms of waves.
In a word, true suchness is absolute tranquility beyond both motion 
and tranquility (water as such in its wetness), while the potential for true 
suchness is always a tranquility in relation to motion (water as waves). It is 
precisely because tranquility presupposes motion that the mind of potential 
buddhahood is able to harmonize birth and extinction in a way that they are 
distinct but not separate. Hence its names “store consciousness” and “har-
monic consciousness of truth and delusion” (真妄和合識). Store conscious-
ness is the ground of being for ordinary and ignorant persons. As that which 
makes all experience possible, it is defiled with the afflictions of greed, anger, 
jealousy, pride, and so forth. This enabling power is expressed in the word 
“store” (蔵).
If we expand the meaning of these Buddhist notions to include metaphys-
Inoue Katsuhito: the philosophical world of meiji japan | 27
ics, tathatā, the true suchness of reality as it originally is, represents the indi-
visible totality that enables an inexhaustible variety of individual beings to 
appear throughout the universe. As such, it must originally be itself a “noth-
ingness” or “emptiness,” that is to say, an absolute but hidden potential. This 
means that truth as tathatā lies at the foundation of each phenomenal being 
as a metaphysical noumenon: as it subsumes all things in its foundational 
potential for existence, it releases all things to manifest themselves just as 
they are. In other words, all individual beings in the phenomenal world exist 
in the truth that makes their appearance possible; at the same time, as the 
condition for the possibility of individual entities, truth resides in every-
thing it makes manifest, transcending them as the noumenal potential of 
their phenomenal manifestation. 
Since truth as tathatā is marked by these two ontologically opposing 
aspects, the darkness of ignorance, which at first seems to stand in direct 
opposition to truth, turns out, ontologically, to be none other than truth 
itself. This is expressed in phrases such as “affliction-in-enlightenment,” 
“life-and-death-in-nirvana,” and “form is emptiness, emptiness is form.” The 
latent potency and manifest actuality of truth as suchness (真如) come about 
in sharp opposition and mutual contradiction. Accordingly, the phenom-
enal world governed by delusion is, on one hand, a deviation from the origi-
nal state of things in their true suchness, but on the other hand and viewed 
from a different angle, that same world is seen to be the self-unfolding of 
truth itself. Obviously, ideas of “original enlightenment,” which uphold the 
position that “all sentient beings have the potential to become buddhas” 
and that “mountains and rivers, grasses and trees all have the potential to 
become buddhas,” derive their inspiration from this idea of truth as original 
suchness. In a word, phenomena, just as they are, are a picture of true reality. 
This is the theory of phenomena-in-reality. 
As we have seen from the metaphor of water and wave, the standpoint of 
the afm adopts a logic of “essence-function” (体用) or, if you will, of imma-
nent transcendence. Essence-function is a term used in connection with cau-
sality. Whereas the relation between wind and wave is set up as causal, that 
between water and wave is one of essence-function. Essence refers to what 
is fundamental and natural; function, to what is derivative and functional. 
To paraphrase, the term expresses the relationship between noumenal 
essence and phenomenal function. A causal relationship is one that relates 
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one entity to another as cause to effect. The essence-function relationship, 
in contrast, is described as mutual entailment or relational correspondence, 
such that we may say “essence-in-function, function-in-essence.” 
In short, there is a certain unifying principle that autonomously unfolds 
itself so as to reside in all things while maintaining its own transcendent 
structure. This idea of the systematic development of a One is connected 
with the idea of “divine principle” (天理) in Song Studies, in particular, 
to the “rational monism” of Cheng Yi (程頤 1033–1107) of the Zhu Xi 
school of neo-Confucianism. The claim is that a single transcendent ratio-
nality is portioned out to every thing and event, each of which manifests 
the one rational principle in its own particular way of being. The logic of 
essence-function also shows up among others of the school, beginning with 
Zhu Xi himself who argues in the first chapter of his Passages on the Mean 
(『中庸章句』) that “the great original is the body (体) of the Way and those 
who master the way become its working (用).” The first volume of his col-
lected works (『朱子語類』) opens with the assertion:
If we are to speak of the way of being of yin and yang, the working (用) 
resides in the light of yang and the body (体) in the darkness of yin, but 
motion-and-tranquility is without bounds and yin-and-yang is without 
beginning: it is not possible to separate one from the other.
At other times, “body” is associated with “essence” (性) and “working” with 
“circumstances” (情). Furthermore, in Song China we see the idea of the 
“unimpeded relationship of principle and things” (理事無碍) or the “unim-
peded relationship among all things” (事事無碍). The idea was adopted 
from Huayan Buddhism, which exerted a dominating influence on Kanna 
Zen and Chinese society in general at the time, to some extent including the 
Zhu Xi school thinkers who shared the same insight. Put in other words, the 
common thread by which these thinkers weave their accounts is the image 
of a teleological harmony and mutuality between the whole and the parts—
in effect, a “philosophy of organism.” Herewe see the foundation of an East-
ern way of thinking that differs from the Western dualistic thinking with its 
assumption of an absolute transcendence subsisting outside the immanence 
of phenomenal reality. 
It seems impossible to determine definitively whether the idea of essence-
function originated in Buddhism or Confucianism. According to Shimada 
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Kenji (1917–2000), the idea is extremely familiar to traditional forms of 
Chinese philosophy that do not posit a transcendent creator outside of real-
ity, making it likely that the idea originated there, at least in latent form.18 
Be that as it may, it is no exaggeration to say that through their strug-
gles with Western philosophy, Meiji philosophers sought to shed light on 
a distinctively Eastern way of thinking in the logic of an immanent tran-
scendence based on the notion of essence and function, that is to say, in a 
“philosophy of organism.” 
[Translated by Morisato Takeshi]
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